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 THE EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF TOLERANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper incorporates the phenomenon of tolerance, as the ability to 
accept diversity, into an economic analysis showing how different 
aptitudes to trust and cooperation can affect economic outcomes. In 
the economic system we propose, tolerance is associated with the 
different weight that agents attribute to their own nature and to the 
institutional parameters in their utility function. We thus construct 
a model of overlapping generations, showing that the incentives that 
influence descendants’ predisposition to tolerance depend on both 
institutional factors, where behaviour is imposed by rules, and on 
social (or cultural) factors, found in popular customs and established 
traditions. Our study highlights the absolute impossibility of 
affirming tolerance through formal rules. In fact, intolerance is a 
persistent attitude and its control is only possible through constant 
and continuous interventions on the educational processes of new 
generations (intolerance trap). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
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This paper demonstrates that the phenomenon of tolerance, defined as a 
generic ability to accept diversity, can easily be integrated into an economic 
model, providing a new explanation for a number of both economic and social 
phenomena. The economic literature on this subject is fairly recent; intolerant 
behavior inevitably affects several important factors of economic growth and 
social development, such as trust between economic agents, cooperation, the 
free movement of ideas and talent and at the same time promoting corruption 
and rewarding group membership rather than merit. 
The theory developed in this article is the natural continuation of 
Iannaccone’s (1997) economic study on fundamentalism that recently 
culminated in Arce-Sandler’s (2003-2008) and Epstein-Gang’s (2007) 
theoretical models and in Corneo-Jeanne’s (2009) preliminary and pioneering 
study on the economic theory of tolerance.  
In this paper, we adopt a model to analyze the evolution and persistence of 
social attitudes towards tolerance through the dynamic properties of a precise 
mechanism of cultural transmission and socialization.  
More specifically, tolerance is incorporated in a model of overlapping 
generations, showing that this has a remarkable impact on the economic 
equilibria of the system. In our model, the cultural values of tolerance are 
transmitted through the educational efforts exerted by parents on their 
children. However, the incentives that influence the descendants’ 
predisposition to tolerance depend on both institutional factors, where 
behaviors are imposed by rules, and on social (or cultural) factors, found in 
popular customs and established traditions. The tolerant individual reaches a 
compromise between the different influences by minimizing the friction 
between his own and social choices. In this choice, economic-type evaluations 
will prevail. 
Our model hypothesizes that there are two social categories, 'tolerant' and 
'intolerant', identified on the basis of their different behavioral characteristics, 
or rather, by a different representation of own preferences. Each member of 
the population assumes either the 'tolerant' or 'intolerant' characteristics 
deriving from the educational efforts of parents in the transmission of these 
characteristics. According to Bisin-Verdier’s (2000) approach, parents choose 
the cultural transmission coefficient (educational effort), or rather, the 
probability with which their cultural traits (their true disposition to tolerance) 
are adopted by the child. If the child (i.e. the new generation) does not learn 
from the parent, then she will assume the character of an individual at random. 
Our analysis demonstrates that the model is able to replicate some important 
social phenomena, such as the persistence of widespread intolerance in 
countries that have adopted strong legislation to protect freedom and respect 
for diversity (Inglehart, 1997 - Inglehart-Baker, 2000). 
 
Under specific conditions and institutional arrangements, society can converge 
on one of two possible stable equilibria: a "good equilibrium" where there is a 
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balance between the share of tolerant and intolerant individuals and a "bad 
equilibrium" characterized by widespread intolerance where tolerant 
individuals, representing a minority, are encouraged to hide their true character.  
What is interesting is that equilibrium with widespread tolerance ('good 
equilibrium') is particularly fragile in the sense that, following a minimal change 
in the expectations of agents, the system tends to move away from this, 
automatically converging towards the 'bad equilibrium'. In contrast, equilibrium 
with widespread intolerance is particularly robust, insensitive to any changes in 
agents’ expectations. The system, therefore, tends to naturally exist in a 
situation called the "intolerance trap" where the only means to exit is through 
constant public interventions. Significant policy implications derive from these 
propositions. The maintenance of a social system inspired by the values of 
tolerance requires a steady and sustained commitment from the authorities, 
since the system is unable to ensure its own stability. This result provides a 
convincing explanation of the frequent outbursts of intolerance that occur in 
societies, which for some time now have been considered free from ideological 
constraints, and respectful of diversity but also explains the profound 
differences in the levels of tolerance between different industrialized countries. 
From an economic perspective, this study allows assessing the effectiveness of 
specific policy interventions in order to facilitate the dissemination and 
integration of values in society. The model demonstrates the ineffectiveness of 
policies aimed at spreading tolerance based exclusively on legislative and 
institutional reforms, suggesting instead the adoption of systems that leverage 
on 'profound' factors, through the appropriate education of young generations. 
Such interventions, however, must never stop: any disruption would in fact 
plunge society back into a state dominated by intolerance.  
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model or agents’ 
preferences and associated educational choices; in section 3 we determine the 
equilibrium steady state of the system by identifying its main characteristics and 
showing under which conditions the system enters into the intolerance trap; in 
section 4 we analyze the economic policy implications arising from the 
propositions set forth in the previous sections; section 5 contains our 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
In this section, we propose a model of overlapping generations in which 
each individual lives for two periods, first as a child (new agent) and then as an 
adult (older agent). In the first period of life, the child has not yet assumed well-
defined cultural traits and preferences, which are instead acquired through 
observation, imitation and the adoption of the cultural models that they will 
come into contact with. 
Every child, in fact, is first subjected to the influences of the family 
(represented by an adult) and then to those of society. In the former case, this 
 4
is about vertical transmission, in the latter the oblique transmission of cultural 
traits1. In this context, the socialization process can be interpreted as the result 
of an economic choice: each parent (adult) will invest resources in an effort to 
educate the child according to her aptitudes. The parent’s educational effort is 
subject to a form of myopia known as "imperfect empathy" and plays a key 
role in the analysis: the parent is altruistic but perceives the child's welfare 
through a filter of her own preferences.  
The tolerant parent exercises an educational effort iτ , which also indicates 
the probability with which this effort will succeed, in which case the child will 
assume the same preferences as the parent. Otherwise, she will remain naive 
(without well-defined preferences), and will begin to be subjected to the 
influences of society. That is she will become a tolerant adult with probability 
iz (which indicates the portion of tolerant individuals in society) and she will 
become intolerant with a specular probability of iz−1 .   
The incentive for adults to influence their descendants’ predisposition 
towards tolerance also depends on institutional factors, specifically on the 
expectations of how much the value of tolerance will be protected by 
regulations and social relations. To this end, the model hypothesizes a simple 
mechanism for the formation of institutions whereby norms and attitudes are 
affirmed. 
The social life of an individual can thus be ascribed to three environmental 
influences2: 
• an institutional environment, in which behaviors and attitudes are 
governed by laws (formal rules); 
• a social environment, which summarizes customs and traditions 
(informal norms), not necessarily in line with that established by 
law; 
• an individual environment, represented by the individual’s set of values 
and attitudes, the result of upbringing and social conditioning.  
 
        The three environments are closely interlinked: the generalized attitudes 
of individuals consolidate traditions and customs that, in turn, contribute to the 
formation of laws (North 1990). On the other hand, as will become clearer 
later on, the regulatory apparatus of a State can induce significant changes in 
the evolutionary dynamics of individual aptitudes, thus inverting the causality 
link. The tolerant individual makes a clear compromise between the different 
influential environments, endeavoring to create the least amount of friction 
between his choices and those imposed by norms and personal aptitudes. To 
                                                 
1 The transmission mechanism of cultural traits hypothesized in the paper is in accordance  
with Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman’s (1981) key studies on cultural anthropology and with 
the literature on endogenous preferences (Becker, 1996). 
2 Many sociological studies use similar conceptualizations to those we have introduced. See in 
this regard Persell-Green-Gurevich (2001). 
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the contrary, the intolerant individual, in making his own choices, takes into 
account only the values and standards pertaining to her individual sphere, not 
accepting any compromise with that established by the rules (formal and 
informal) that are inconsistent with her own principles. The ideological 
fundamentalism that characterizes the intolerant person leads her to assign the 
maximum loss of welfare to any deviation, even minimal, from her own 
principles and to attribute the highest satisfaction in all cases where these 
principles are fully respected, even if the institutional context openly condemns 
them3.  
As observed by Sen (2006), the fundamentalist has a strong sense of belonging 
to specific values and principles, which sooner or later will lead to conflict with 
people and institutions that do not share them, openly manifesting his 
intolerance.  
 
 
2.1 The preferences 
Economic agents are distinguished by their predisposition to tolerance. This 
model studies the simplest case where there are only two types of individuals: 
those with attitude a , the tolerant, and those with attitude b , the intolerant. 
Let us suppose that tolerance is measured by an index i  so that [ ]i supa =  and 
[ ]i infb =  where 1=a  and 0=b . 
As will be made clearer later on, an individual type that has a measure of 
tolerance bai ,=  can actually manifest behavior that is "remote" from her own 
nature, i.e., declaring through her choices a tolerance level ajb <<  as a result 
of the conditions created by formal and informal rules. An individual of type 
bai ,=  can manifest his predisposition to tolerance in such a way as to 
minimize the following quadratic function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )  −+−+−= 232221 iiinfiifii miamamaU θθ  
 
where amb i ≤≤  indicates the declared predisposition to tolerance, ab f ≤≤θ  
the tolerance level of formal institutions, ab nf ≤≤θ  the tolerance level of 
informal institutions and  i the individual’s actual predisposition to tolerance. 
The vector ( )iii aaa 321 ,,  is indicative of the saliency that the individual assigns 
to the various environmental influences (institutional, social and individual), 
with   13
1∑ = =j jia  and 0≥jia .  
 
In distinguishing only two types of individuals, the objective function becomes: 
                                                 
3 Rather often, individuals openly demonstrate intolerance despite facing sanctions, in 
demonstration of how ideology prevails over evaluations of convenience. 
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( ) ( ) ( )  −+−+−= 232221 1 aaanfaafaa mamamaU θθ  
 
for the tolerant individual and 
 
( ) ( ) ( )  −+−+−= 232221 0 bbbnfbbfbb mamamaU θθ  
 
for the intolerant individual. 
 
The difference between a tolerant and an intolerant individual resides in the 
different weight they attribute to their own nature )( 3ia and to the institutional 
parameters ),( 21 ii aa . 
 The intolerant individual is by nature averse to the principles of sharing and 
socializing with people who do not have the same preferences. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that she tends to indulge and manifest high levels of 
intolerance, even though condemned at the institutional and social level. In his 
decisional process, therefore, the intolerant individual attaches little weight to 
institutional parameters: without compromising the results of the model, it is 
assumed that 13 =ba , for which the objective function is reduced to 
( )2bb mU −= . 
To the contrary, the tolerant individual tries to create minimal friction between 
her attitude and that determined by formal and informal rules. The distribution 
of weight will thus be less unbalanced than that of the intolerant individual, i.e. ( ) 0,, 321 >>aaa aaa .   
By minimizing the objective function, we obtain the tolerance attitude of the 
two types of agents: 
0*
321
*
=
++=
b
a
nf
a
f
aa
m
aaam θθ
. 
 
where 10 * ≤< am   and 1* == ama  when 1== nff θθ . 
Now we expand the model by adding the temporal dimension and considering 
an overlapping generation mechanism by which parents and society transmit 
cultural traits to future generations.  
Each agent lives two periods. In the first period, she is a child and has no 
specific preferences; in the second, she becomes an adult with a definitive 
attitude towards tolerance and chooses to manifest the attitude by maximizing 
her utility function.   
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Preferences are transmitted to the child by the parent’s educational efforts 
(vertical transmission) and by the cultural influences of society (oblique 
transmission)4: if the child does not learn from the parent, she adopts the 
preferences of a randomly chosen adult. Parents want to maximize their child’s 
future well-being, but they evaluate the welfare of their children through their 
own preference structure according to the hypothesis of imperfect empathy 
(see Bisin-Verdier, (2000, 2001))5.  
Empathy is the psychological process that consists in directly absorbing the 
emotional conditions of another person; the imperfection we attribute to this 
process consists in a kind of myopic behavior of the parent who evaluates the 
future choices of his child without considering the child’s effective preferences 
and exclusively referring to their own.  
To formalize these concepts let us suppose at time t each adult of type i  
( )bai ,=  has a child and chooses the effort itτ  to educate it. This effort equates 
to the probability with which the child will adopt the parent’s 
preferences ( )10 ≤≤ itτ . Now, letting jitP ,  be the transition probability that a 
child of parent i  is of type j  and considering a  tolerant adult, we can write  ( ) tatataat zP ττ −+= 1,  ( )( )tatbat zP −−= 11, τ  
 
where tz  is the proportion of tolerant adults at time t. Similarly, for the 
intolerant adult we have  ( )( )tbtbtbbt zP −−+= 11, ττ  ( ) .1, tbtabt zP τ−=  
2.2 The education choice 
 
We can now characterize the education choice. 
A type i  parent will choose the educational effort [ ]1,0∈iτ , which maximizes 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )iejitjiteiitiiti CUPUP τθθβ −+=Γ ,,,,  
 
where β  is the discount rate, ( )itC τ  the cost of educational effort made by the 
type i parent which is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly 
convex with ( ) 00 =C , ( ) 00 =′C  and that for all τ  0>′>′′ CC , and ( )ejitU θ,  
                                                 
4 On the concepts of vertical and oblique transmission of cultural traits, see Cavalli-Sforza, 
(1996) and Cavalli-Sforza, Fieldman, (1981). 
5 Given that at the time of its education the child still has no precise preferences, the parent 
evaluates the child’s future utilities through her own perspective. In other words, she will use 
her own utility function as if it were the child’s. 
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the expected utility from the economic action of a type j  child as perceived by 
a type i  parent when she expects ( ) ( )],[ nffe EE θθθ = . ( )ejitU θ,  is therefore 
dependent on the expectations on the future level of tolerance in formal and 
informal institutions. 
Given the assumption of imperfect empathy, when estimating ( )ejitU θ,  the 
type i  parent will apply her own utility function.  
However we suppose a fundamental difference in the educational aptitude of 
intolerant adults. The intolerant adult will only accept the full sharing of her 
own values, assigning any deviation from them to a maximum loss of 
wellbeing. Despite the tolerance manifested by a tolerant child being  
amb a ≤< * , the intolerant parent will value this choice as if   1* == ama , thus 
assigning a maximum loss of wellbeing to tolerance: in fact, it can be 
demonstrated that  bU argmaxb =   and  bU argmina = . From these 
considerations we can see that, independently of expectations, for the 
intolerant parent it will always be 0=bbU   and  1−=baU . 
We consider this behavior to be close to the “fundamentalist” attitude typical 
of intolerant individuals. 
Furthermore, given that  0** => ba mm   we get  ( ) ( )ejieii UU θθ ,, >   for each 
eθ . That is, each parent prefers a child that adopts her own preferences.  
By solving the maximization problem6 and suppressing the time indicators, we 
obtain the following conditions: 
 ( )( ) ( )abaaa CzUU τβ ′=−− 1,,  
 ( ) ( )babbb CzUU τβ ′=− ,,   
 
 
From these equations, it follows that the optimal effort level is ( )ijiiii UUz −= ,ττ , baji ,, =  ji ≠ . 
 
Using the implicit function theorem, we get  
 ( )( ) 0
,,
<′′
−−=∂
∂
a
baaaa
C
UU
z τ
βτ   
 
 ( )( ) 0
,,
>′′
−=∂
∂
b
abbbb
C
UU
z τ
βτ . 
                                                 
6 Note that ( )τC  must be sufficiently convex so that the optimal solution is 10 <<τ . 
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Given that jiii UU ,, −  depends on the expectations, the same will apply to the 
educational effort ( )ijiiii UUz −= ,ττ . 
 
The educational effort of type a  (tolerant agent) decreases as the proportion 
of tolerant agents increases. In fact, higher values of z indicate a higher 
probability that the child assumes the same preferences as the parent simply by 
socializing with a member of society; this induces the parent to reduce the 
educational effort. Similarly, if the proportion of tolerant agents increases, 
intolerant parents must intensify their educational efforts. 
 
We can now characterize the dynamic behavior of tz  with the following 
difference equation:  
( ) abttaattt PzPzz ,,1 1−+=+  
  
where substituting for aatP ,  and abtP ,  the dynamic equations becomes  
 
( )( )btattttt zzzz ττ −−+=+ 11  . 
 
The analysis of the dynamic equation will concentrate on the stable expectation 
hypothesis, with abaa UU −   and   babb UU −  constant for each t. 
 
In this hypothesis this difference equation has two unstable fixed points 0=z  
and 1=z , and  a unique stable fixed point  *zz =   
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) UUUU UUz eabebbebaeaa
ebaeaa
e
θθθθ
θθθ
,,,,
,,
*
−+−
−=  
 
with ba ττ = . 
 
(Proof: see appendix) 
 
 
2.3 The choice of institutions 
In this model we distinguish between formal and informal institutions, 
according to North’s definition (North, 1990), and formalize the concept by 
using the vector ( )nff θθθ ,= . According to this definition, formal institutions 
are the political, social and economic regulations in force; they usually emerge 
to increase the effectiveness of habits, customs and religious traits (informal 
institutions) diffused in the population. We can thus suppose that informal 
institutions represent the level of tolerance of the prevailing type in each 
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period. If the fraction tz  is larger than 21 , then tolerant agents are in the 
majority and their attitudes constitute informal institutions, and 1== anfθ . On 
the other hand when tz  is less than 21 , the level of 
nfθ  will be strongly 
affected by fundamentalist customs and 0== bnfθ . 
 
To summarize 



≤
>
=
2
1
2
1
)(
t
t
t
nf
zifb
zifa
zθ   
 
The mechanism we have introduced allows us to formalize the idea that 
tolerant habits and beliefs spread when there is insufficient social aversion to 
oppose them.  
On the other hand, institutions reduce the cost of individual convictions, and 
hence ideologies, religion and moral codes can produce very significant 
institutional alterations (North, 1990). This consideration allows us to assume 
that when formal institutions evolve freely (that is, without exogenous 
impositions) they will tend to coincide with informal rules as time goes by, that 
is, for a fixed level of nfθ , nff θθ →  during a finite time t. 
 
 
3. THE STEADY STATE 
We can now characterize the steady states according to the expected level of  
tolerance in formal and informal institutions.  
 
Lemma 1 
Given an expected institutional vector eθ  then ba ττ <>  when ( )et zz θ*>< . 
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
 
Lemma 2 
Each institutional combination ( )jie ,=θ ,  with aib ≤≤  and ajb ≤≤ , 
generates a unique and different stable steady state ),(*, jizz ji =  with fi θ=  
and nfj θ= . However, given the assumptions on institutions, we only consider 
institutional situations with baf ,=θ  and banf ,=θ ; thus the following 
relations hold: 
 
1) 21, =aaz . 
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2) 21, <bbz ; babb zz <, ; abbb zz <, . 
3) 21, <baz  ,  21, <abz  , abba zz ,, >< . 
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
The stable steady state abz ,  can be excluded from the analysis inasmuch as, 
given the hypothesis on the formation mechanism of institutions, tolerance is 
limited by  informal institutions when tolerant individuals are the minority 
group. 
For the moment, we also exclude from the analysis the study of convergence 
towards the equilibrium point baz , , since this can be reached only with 
intervention on a regulatory level that imposes tolerance through formal rules. 
This aspect will be discussed in detail in section 4.1, which further analyses the 
role of policy in the dissemination of tolerance. 
 
Proposition 1 (intolerance trap): As Bisin-Verdier (1998), we assume that the 
cost function has the quadratic form ( ) ( )
2
2i
iC ττ = 7, { }1,00 ≠z  and that agents 
have rational expectations. We further indicate with ijtz 1+  the proportion of 
tolerant individuals at time 1+t  if at time  t  the expectations are  ( )jie ,=θ   
where  bai ,=   and baj ,= .  
Thus: 
1. tz  converges to bbz  if 21<tz ; 
2. if  21>tz  then 
2.1 tz  converges to aaz ; 
2.2 tz  converges to bbz  only if tz  is sufficiently close to 1/2 such 
that  2/11 <+bbtz . 
 
(Proof: see appendix). 
 
The multiplicity of stable steady states depends on the possibility of having 
different institutions that are able to influence adult expectations on the future 
utility of their children and therefore the amount of educational effort 
exercised by them. 
                                                 
7 It can be easily verified that this function of cost respects all the properties hypothesized at 
the beginning and ensures  10 ≤≤ iτ  being 10 ≤−≤ ijii UU .  
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Only in one case does the educational effort of the tolerant agent exceed that 
of the intolerant agent i.e. when bbt zz < . In this case, however, the only 
rational expectation is  ( )bb,  which determines the convergence to 21<bbz . 
In general, the equilibrium point aaz  or at least a proportion of tolerant 
individuals 21>tz  can never be attained under the assumption of rational 
expectations if 210 <z .  
The resistance of the equilibrium point with intolerance is strongly linked to 
the fact that the intolerant individual assigns a maximum utility loss to 
preferences that are different from his own, i.e.  1−=baU ; for this individual 
the difference babb UU −  that determines his educational effort bτ   is always 
maximum. Only a sufficiently low value of tz , i.e. ( )bbt zz <  can guarantee that 
ba ττ > . In all other cases, the educational effort of the intolerant individual 
tends to prevail, trapping the system in a state where the proportion of tolerant 
individuals can at most be equal to the proportion of intolerant individuals ( )2/1=≤ aat zz 8. This consideration is far from absurd when you consider that 
in reality the fundamentalist attitude of intolerant individuals leads them to 
strongly defend their positions (that is, to exert considerable educational efforts 
to conserve their ideas), even in social contexts where tolerance seems to be a 
custom, and this would explain why intolerance is so persistent.  
Nevertheless, even in a best-case scenario, with the equilibrium proportion of 
tolerant individuals equal to 2/1=aaz , a resumption of convergence towards 
the "bad" steady state is still possible. In this situation, any expectation ( ) ( )aaji ,, ≠  would provoke an immediate reduction of the proportion of 
tolerant individuals with 2/11 <+ijtz . The expectation will be confirmed given 
that  ( ) ( )aaji ,, ≠∀  2/1<ijz  and the system will start to converge again 
towards  bbz . 
This phenomenon is also possible due to the proportion of tolerant individuals 
being above 1/2, provided that the pessimistic expectations ( )bb,  or ( )ba,   are 
able to bring that proportion, as early as in the next period, to below 1/2. 
A high tolerance steady state is fragile. A change in expectations is enough to 
take the system back to bad equilibrium. Once the proportion of tolerant 
individuals has become the minority, the system is no longer able to re-
                                                 
8 If we were to also permit the intolerant individual to assign positive weights to the 
institutional dimension (i.e., 13 <ba )  we would have 2/11
1
2
3
>+= baa a
z  i.e., an increase in 
the share of tolerant individuals in equilibrium. That affirmed in proposition 1 would still be 
valid. However, in this case the system could converge to aaz  if 2/11 >+aatz  even with 
2/1<tz .  
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converge towards the "good” equilibrium, not even in the presence of positive 
expectations since these will never be confirmed. 
 
 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As demonstrated in Proposition 1, under the hypothesis of rational 
expectations the steady state to which the system converges depends on the 
initial proportion of tolerant agents.  Moreover, under appropriate hypotheses, 
society is unable by itself to exit from the “intolerance trap”; if 21<tz , the 
proportion of tolerant agents remain a minority even in the future.   
The model suggests two possible policy measures aimed at increasing the 
proportion of tolerant agents in the population:  
 
1. introduction of formal rules that penalize intolerant behavior;  
2. educational development of the younger generations.  
 
With the first measure, the steady state becomes bbab zz >  giving rise to an 
increase in the proportion of tolerant agents in equilibrium. 
In fact, we hypothesize a majority share of intolerant individuals characterize 
the system, 2/1<tz , and that the government announces an institutional 
reform imposing tolerance for the subsequent periods. This measure will apply 
only to formal institutions so that agents’ expectations will be ( )bae ,=θ  from 
then onwards, and tz  will converge to  bbab zz > . Given that 2/1<abz , 
intolerant individuals will nevertheless remain in the majority; the action was 
unable to change the preferences of society enough so that, although 
sanctioned by law, intolerance will continue to be practiced by the majority of 
individuals.  The system will converge again to bbz  as soon as the legislation in 
favor of tolerance is withdrawn. This type of intervention is not very effective 
in the long term. Tolerance, in fact, is the result of a cultural process whose 
evolution involves several generations. It is therefore unreasonable to think of 
influencing the nature and preferences of individuals through legal provisions 
that contrast the customs that are prevalent in society.  
 
The second measure consists in the institutions’ direct efforts in educating new 
generations in tolerance.  
We have thus far considered the possibility of modifying a society’s 
predisposition to tolerance through regulatory action imposing tolerant 
behavior. However, these interventions do not significantly condition the 
educational process that regulates the transmission of preferences. 
In this regard, it is appropriate to evaluate the effect of government policies 
aimed at spreading tolerance through the educational system. This type of 
policy, unlike the preceding, has a direct impact on the processes of preference 
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transmission, inasmuch as the government’s efforts are integrated with the 
educational efforts of parents.  
We therefore hypothesize that when the parent’s educational effort is 
unsuccessful, there is a probability ρ that the individual becomes tolerant 
thanks to the education received in schools. If even this is unsuccessful in 
defining the preferences of the individual, then she will assume the preferences 
of a subject chosen randomly from the population.   
The transition probabilities thus become: 
 ( ) ( )( )ρρττ +−−+= 11, tatataat zP  
 ( )( )( )ρτ −−−= 111, tatbat zP  
 ( )( )( )tbtbtbbt zP −−−+= 111, ρττ  
 ( ) ( )( )ρρτ +−−= 11, tbtabt zP . 
 
 
generating the following dynamic equation: 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }ρτττρ btbtattttt zzzz −+−−−=−+ 1111 . 
 
 
The stable steady states are  1=z  and 0=z  if  0=ρ . 
If an internal equilibrium exists, then  ab ττ > . 
With 1=ρ  the system converges to 1. Thus, due to continuity, there must be 
10 << ρ  such that 01 >−+ tt zz    for any   1<z . 
More precisely, 01 >−+ tt zz  if  ( )( ) Ω≡−−+ −> babt
ab
t
z
z
τττ
ττρ
1
. 
 
Immediately verifying that  0>∂Ω∂ tz   and that for 1=tz ,  ( )1bτ=Ω . So it is 
sufficient that the government exercises an educational effort  ( )1bτρ >  so 
have a growing proportion of tolerant individuals9. 
The educational effort towards tolerance exercised by the government must 
never cease, even when 2/1>tz . Discontinuity ( 0=ρ ) would make the 
                                                 
9 Given the quadratic form hypothesized for the cost function, the convergence to 1 of the 
share of tolerant individuals is ensured by βρ > . 
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system converge (at best) to aaz  where we have already witnessed that a 
worsening of expectations would plunge the system back towards intolerance. 
The lesson is that tolerance can spread in society only if governments agree on 
permanent dissemination through direct interventions in the educational 
processes of new generations. Schools at every level, information, politics and 
religious institutions must be vigilant and continually educate on tolerance. The 
social system cannot autonomously guarantee, i.e. relying only on the role of 
families, the stable establishment of tolerance as a consolidated and permanent 
principle over time. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Building on recent efforts on the evolutionary dynamics of fundamentalism 
and cultural transmission, the present paper concentrates on issues relating to 
the formation and stability of attitudes towards tolerance and intolerance. The 
dynamic equation of the model demonstrates that a degenerate distribution of 
the population (whereby agents are all tolerant or all intolerant) is dynamically 
unstable. Moreover, under some conditions and for a specific institutional asset 
a unique non-degenerate stationary distribution exists (in which both tolerance 
and intolerance co-exist in the population), and this distribution is locally 
stable. Finally, we studied the dependence of the population dynamics on 
institutional changes and policy interventions showing that tolerance cannot be 
disseminated through formal rules but requires that authorities act directly on 
the educational processes of new generations. In this sense, it is hoped that the 
government carries out an educational effort  through schools in an attempt to 
predispose young people towards tolerance. Furthermore, intolerance is a 
persistent attitude; it can not be totally eliminated from society and tends to 
reemerge also in social contexts that are characterized by a widespread respect 
for diversity as soon as the public educational commitment (mainly through 
schools) stops being sufficiently incisive. 
However, the assumption that the different predispositions to tolerance do not 
have an obvious effect on the economic opportunities of agents is somewhat 
limited. Further developments of the model should remove this assumption, in 
order to apply the analysis to contexts where agents belonging to different 
social groups interact not only in relation to cultural conditioning but also in 
real and actual business transactions. 
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Appendix 
Considering the dynamic equation of population ( )( )btattttt zzzz ττ −−+=+ 11 ; 
we note that it has three rest points: i) 0=z , ii) 1=z  and iii) *zz = with 
ba ττ = .  
Deriving the dynamic equation with respect to tz  we obtain 
( )( ) ( ) 



∂
∂−∂
∂−+−−+=∂
∂ +
t
b
t
a
tt
ba
t
t
t
zz
zzz
z
z ττττ 12111 . 
Then  
11
0
1 >+=∂
∂
=
+ a
zt
t
t
z
z τ   given that ( ) ( )00 =⇒= btz τ   
( )( ) 111
1
1 >−−+=∂
∂
=
+ b
zt
t
t
z
z τ   given that ( ) ( )01 =⇒= atz τ  
then points 0=z  and 1=z  are not stable. 
To evaluate the stability of point ( )ez θ* , rewrite the derivative of the dynamic 
equation as 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )



′′
∆−′′
∆−−+−−+=∂
∂ +
b
b
a
b
tt
ba
t
t
t
CC
zzz
z
z
τ
β
τ
βττ 12111  
given ( )( )zC
a
a
−
′=∆
1β
τ  e  ( )
z
C b
β
τ′=∆2  ;  
thus 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )



′′
′−−′′
′−+−−+=∂
∂ +
b
b
ta
a
t
ba
t
t
t
C
Cz
C
Czz
z
z
τ
τ
τ
τττ 12111 . 
Evaluating this derivative in ∗= zzt , i.e. considering ba ττ =  and given 
CC ′′<′ τ∀  we have 
( )
( ) ( )1,011 ∈



′′
′−=∂
∂
∗=
+
τ
τ
C
C
z
z
zzt
t
t
 
 and conclude that ∗= zzt  is asymptotically  stable. ■ 
 
 
Lemma 1: Given that ( ) ( )eabeaa UU θθ >  and ( ) ( )ebaebb UU θθ > , by the first 
order condition of the parent maximization problem, each type of agent 
chooses a positive educational effort, 0>aτ  and 0>bτ . 
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To obtain point ( )ez θ*  we have to consider that 21 ττ >  implies 
( ) ( )ba CC ττ ′>′ . Thus ( )( ) ( )zz ba ∆>−∆ ββ 1  and hence 
ba
a
z ∆−∆
∆< , with 
( ) ( )ejieiii UU θθ ,, −=∆ , baji ,, =  and ji ≠ .■ 
 
 
Lemma 2:  Let i khm ,  be the tolerance shown by an individual of type i when 
the tolerance at institutional level is  hf t=θ   and  knf t=θ ;  let  ji khU ,,    be the 
expected utility that a parent of type i  associates with a type j  child,  being the 
expectation hf t=θ   and   knf t=θ .  
 
Minimization of the utility function gives the following: 
- for type  at :  1=aaam  ; 21 am aab −= ; 11 am aba −= ; 3am abb =  . 
- for type bt :  0=bm  eθ∀ . 
 
from which, given the assumption of imperfect empathy, we obtain: 
 
for type at :   
 
 
0=aaaaU  1−=abaaU  
( )22 1 aaU aaab −−=  ( )21 aU abab −−=  
( )11 1 aaU aaba −−=  ( )111 aU abba −−=  
( )33 1 aaU aabb −−=  3aU abbb −=  
 
for type bt :   
 
0=bbU  and 1−=baU  eθ∀  
 
We can now obtain the value of the different stationary points shown in lemma 
2:  
 
 
2
1=aaz , 
123
2
3
+= a
a
zbb , 
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( )
( ) 11
1
2
2
2
2
+−
−=
a
a
zab , 
( )
( ) 11
1
2
1
2
1
+−
−=
a
a
zba  
 
and given these, proving points 1) 2) and 3) of Lemma 2 is straightforward. ■  
 
 
Proposition 1 
 
From the assumption of proposition 1, we can verify 2/1=aaz  and 
01 >∂∂ + tt zz  ( )1,0∈∀ tz . This latter condition ensures that the convergence 
occurs without oscillations around the equilibrium point. Thus: 
1. if 2/1<tz   and 2/11 <+tz   eθ∀  and the only rational 
expectations are ),( bbe =θ ; from lemma 1  tz  converges to 
bbz . 
2. if  2/1>tz  then: 
a. expectations ),( aae =θ  are always rational 
since 2/1>∀ tz , we have  2/11 >+aatz . From lemma 1 tz  
converges to aaz . 
b. There is a  2/1>z  such that if  zzt <≤2/1  then 
2/11 <+bbtz , to thus verify the expectations ( )bbe ,=θ . 
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